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A Teacher's Right to Remain Silent: 
Reasonable Accommodation of Negative Speech 
Rights in the Classroom 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nearly every significant case analyzing public school teacher 
speech rights in the classroom involves affirmative expression. 1 This 
should come as no surprise, given that the learning process in the 
classroom is built on active speech, mostly by the teacher.2 But what 
happens when the school district's approved curriculum compels a 
teacher to express views that contradict the teacher's own deeply 
held personal or religious beliefs? Given that the First Amendment 
protects "both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from 
speaking at all," 3 may the teacher refl.1se? 
In Palmer v. Board of Education,4 one of the few cases to 
squarely address the issue of a teacher's negative speech rights in the 
classroom, s the Seventh Circuit answered with a conclusory "No. " 6 
I. See, e..q., Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 f.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(involving a teacher taking a stance on a contentious political issue in a classroom current 
es·ents discussion); Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 f.3d 1036 (6th Cir. 2001) 
( irwoh-ing a teacher's presentation on industrial hemp in class); Boring v. Buncombe County 
Bd. of Educ., 136 f.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (involving a teacher's choice of a play for a 
student production at school); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 
1989) ( inYoh·ing a teacher's use of a supplemental reading list at variance with district-
prescribed curriculum). 
2. Sec Todd A. DeMitchell, A New Balance of In-Class Speech: No Longer just a 
"Mouthpiea," 31 I .L. & Enuc. 473, 474-75 (2002). According to a study conducted by Ned 
flanders (not to be confused with The Simpson.<' inimitably pious neighbor) and cited by 
DeMitchell, "teacher talk consists of approximately 80% of classroom activity." Id. at 475 
(citing ]\;ED FLA:-.:DER..'>, A;-..:AJYZING TEACHING BEHAVIOR ( 1970) ). 
3. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 ( 1977) (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,633-34 (1943)). 
4. 603 f.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979). 
5. Indeed, other than Peloza P. Capistrano Unified School District, 37 F.3d 517 (9th 
Cir. I 994) (rejecting biology teacher's claim that the school district violated his First 
Amendment rights by forcing him to teach evolution to his students), this was the only case I 
could find dealing with a teacher's negative speech rights, which represents an even narrower 
subcategory of the "narrow" exception to state control of curriculum for religious expression 
.md belief~ affirmative or negative, discussed by the Palmer court. See Palmer, 603 F.2d at 
1273 l'clo;::,a will not be addressed as extensively as Palmer because the teacher in the former 
case primarily relied on an Establishment Clause argument in which he argued that evolution 
705 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
But the Palmer court largely ignored the issue of negative speech 
rights and based its holding instead on cases that involved 
affirmative speech rights in conflict with the prescribed curriculum.7 
According to the Palmer analysis, it is irrelevant whether teachers are 
actively disregarding the curriculum in favor of their own content/ 
or merely refusing to teach material that contradicts their deeply held 
beliefs.9 The First Amendment provides no protection in either case 
because teachers do not have such authority over the curriculum. 10 
Simply put, if the end result is frustration of the prescribed 
curriculum, it makes no constitutional difference to the analysis what 
reasons teachers give to justifY or explain their behavior. 
But it should make a difference. If we accept as true that 
"teachers [do not] shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,''" then efforts must be 
made to preserve these rights so long as the efficient operation of 
public schools is not unduly compromised. 12 As such, school districts 
was a religion. See Peloza, 37 F. 3d at 520. 
6. See Palmer, 603 F.2d at 1274 ("PlaintitPs right to her own religious views and 
practices remains unlettered, but she has no constitutional right to require others to submit to 
her views and to forego a portion of their education they would otherwise be entitled to 
enjoy."). 
7. Id. at 1273. The court cited three principal cases in support of its holding. ld. First, 
in Clark l'. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972 ), which, in the Palmer court's view, involved 
a teacher who "ignored the prescribed course content and engaged in unauthorized student 
counseling," the Seventh Circuit held that "the First Amendment was not a teacher license for 
uncontrolled expression at variance with established curricular content." Palmer, 603 F.2d at 
1273. Second, the Palmer court noted that in Ahern 1'. Board of Education, 456 F.2d 399 (8th 
Cir. 1972 ), the Eighth Circuit held "that the Constitution bestowed no right on the teacher to 
disregard the valid dictates of her superiors by teaching politics in a course on economics." 
Palmer, 603 F.2d at 1273. Finally, in Adams v. Campbell County School District, 511 F.2d 
1242 (1Oth Cir. 1975 ), the Tenth Circuit, as the Palmer court found, held "that the Board 
and the principal had a right to insist that a more orthodox teaching approach be used by a 
teacher who was found to have no unlimited authority as to the structure and content of 
courses." Palmer, 603 F.2d at 1273. 
8. This was what occurred in the three cases cited by the Palmer court: Clark, Ahern, 
and Adams. See supra note 7. 
9. See Palmer, 603 F.2d at 1272. 
I 0. See id. at 1272~73. 
11. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 ( 1969). 
12. This approach is analogous to the balancing test used by the Supreme Court in 
PickerinJJ v. Board of Education: "The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the 
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon m~tters of public concern and the 
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the ettlciency of the public services it 
performs through its employees " 391 U.S. 563, 568 ( 1968 ). 
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and school boards should be required to make reasonable 
accommodations, such as an opt out provision, for teachers who 
refuse to teach material that directly violates their deeply held and 
preexisting personal or religious beliefs. 13 The outline of such an 
approach can be drawn from values already present in school speech 
rights precedent, including Palmer. Reasonable accommodation of 
negative speech rights effectively balances the various interests and 
policy considerations implicated by speech rights in the schools, thus 
disarming the "troubling paradox" of democratic education while 
advancing some important educational values. 14 It also displaces the 
government-as-employer from the awkward position of requiring 
speech that is fundamentally inconsistent with the teacher's 
conscience, which is a potentially unconstitutional condition. 
Establishing a more appropriate standard is important because while 
cases involving the negative speech rights of teachers are rare, they 
13. While negative speech cases most often involve religious beliefs, see, e._q., Palmer, 
603 F.2d at 1272, protection should not be limited to one particular subset of speech. This 
Comment advocates a broader approach in keeping with Justice Jackson's opinion in West 
Vir._qinia State Board of Education v. Barnette. See generally 319 U.S. 624 (1943). As 
Professors Nowak and Rotunda observe, "Justice Jackson was careti_Il not to limit the decision 
by basing it on the religion clauses of the First Amendment alone." JOH~ E. NOWAK & 
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 16.4 (2d cd. 2005). Justice 
Jackson clearly signaled the breadth of the Court's opinion in its most tamous line: "If there is 
any tlxcd star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no ofticial, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or 
t(Jrcc citizens to confess by word or act their taith therein." Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 
(emphasis added). 
14. See Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School Today? Free 
Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational Paradox, 88 CoR:--:ELI. L. REV. 62, 
62 (2002). By "troubling paradox," Redish and Finnerty refer to the tension between the need 
in a democratic system for "an educated electorate," facilitated through discussion of diverse 
viewpoints, and the reality of the educational system as "an inherently authoritarian 
institution," designed to inculcate a set of common values. Id. They propose an "anti-
indoctrination" model of First Amendment analysis, "designed to allow courts to curb the 
most egregious governmental erosions of tree thought while simultaneously leaving school 
systems with substantial discretion to control curricular and educational decision making." I d. 
Others have similarly argued that the courts must tind a way to balance these competing goals 
of the public school system described by the Supreme Court. See, e.._q., Walter E. Kuhn, Note, 
First Amendment Protection of Teacher Instructional Speech, 55 DUKE L.J. 995, 997-98 (2006) 
("At times, the Court has suggested that education demands open-mindedness and expression 
of multiple opinions, but at others it has indicated that primary and secondary schools play a 
unique role in inculcating fundamental societal values.") (citations omitted). In some sense, 
trom a teacher's perspective, reasonable accommodation of negative speech rights, as proposed 
in this Comment, serves the same basic end by respecting different opinions without 
undermining the inculcation of the common values chosen by those who ti'ame the 
curriculum. 
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may arise more frequently as contentious political and religious issues 
make their way into primary and secondary school curriculum. 15 
Part II of this Comment reviews precedent in the area of 
negative speech rights for students and teachers to show that this is 
not an altogether foreign concept. Part III discusses the Palmer 
decision in more detail, focusing on the court's failure to adequately 
account for the negative speech rights of teachers in the classroom, 
while also recognizing the value placed by the court on the rights of 
students to learn. Part IV then reviews the most popular analytical 
approaches courts use to determine the extent of free speech rights 
in the public school context, none of which is directly analogous to a 
case involving teacher negative speech rights. Yet at the same time, 
the policies and values reflected in these approaches provide 
guidance in framing a new approach for negative speech rights. 
Finally, Part V advances a reasonable accommodation approach to 
negative speech rights, including threshold limitations to avoid 
widespread litigation. 
II. THE PRECEDENT FOR RECOGNITION OF NEGATIVE SPEECH 
RIGHTS IN SCHOOLS 
Protection for negative speech rights in schools is not a new 
concept. Since the Supreme Court decided West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette,16 students have enjoyed First 
Amendment protection from oft!cially compelled speech in the 
classroom setting. 17 Justice Jackson's poetic prose captures the 
breadth and tenor of this constitutional guarantee: "If there is any 
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no otlicial, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein." 18 Justice Murphy, 
15. The most obvious example would be discussion of sexual orientation, which has 
already resulted in at least one lawsuit by parents asserting tree exercise rights on behalf of their 
children to opt out of lessons designed to teach children about homosexual relationships in '' 
way that contradicted the religious views of the parents and children. Sec Parker \'. H urlcy, 514 
F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2008). 
16. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
17. See id. at 642 ("We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag 
salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere 
of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to 
reserve from all official control."). 
18. Id. 
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concurring in the result, offered a clearer but less colorful view: "The 
right of freedom of thought and of religion as guaranteed by the 
Constitution against State action includes both the right to speak 
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all."19 
Of course, it takes a big leap of faulty logic to extend that same 
broad protection to teachers as public employees charged with 
expressing the values reflected in the curriculum chosen by school 
officials, high or petty. Underscoring this point, Justice Murphy's 
articulation of negative speech rights in Barnette includes a 
significant caveat: the Constitution protects negative speech rights, 
"except in so far as essential operations of government may require 
[affirmative speech] for the preservation of an orderly society. " 20 This 
view finds analogous expression in the realm of affirmative speech 
rights in cases such as Pickering, where the Court weighed the 
teacher's right to expression against the interest of the government 
in efficient operation of the school system.21 More broadly, the 
Supreme Court has long "recognized that the State's interests as an 
employer in regulating the speech of its employees 'differ 
significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of 
the speech of the citizenry in general. "'22 
Notwithstanding the Court's emphasis on the different 
constitutional role of the government-as-employer, there are a 
couple of reasons to believe that stronger negative speech rights 
protection for teachers in the classroom is not merely wishful 
thinking. First, in his Barnette opinion, Justice Jackson actually 
appears to place a greater burden on the state where negative speech 
rights are implicated: In light of the fact that affirmative expression 
can only be restricted by a showing of "clear and present danger," 
"[i]t would seem that involuntary affirmation could be commanded 
only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence. " 23 
Based on that standard, teacher negative speech rights should be 
afforded at least the same, if not more, protection than affirmative 
speech rights in the classroom. While the Barnette analysis applied 
specifically to student negative speech rights, courts have already 
19. Id. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
20. Id. 
21. Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563,568 (1968). 
22. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983) (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). 
23. 319U.S.at633. 
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made a habit of adopting standards from student speech rights cases 
in the context of teacher speech rights. 24 
Second, the Supreme Court's own approach to negative speech 
rights cases remains in flux and unpredictablc. 25 Generally, the Court 
has applied a flexible, fact-based approach, suggesting the need to 
take into account the varied nature and extent of infringement in 
each case.26 If the Court moves instead to "making principled 
24. See, eg., Bishop v. Aronov, 926 f.2d 1066, 1073 (11th Cir. 1991); Roberts v. 
Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1056-57 (lOth Cir. 1990). Bishop relied directly on Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 ( 1988), a case involving restrictions on school-
sponsored student speech. See 926 F.2d at 1071. The Bishop court also specifically discussed 
the Tenth Circuit's reliance in Roberts on both Hazelwood and another student speech case, 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See 926 
F.2d at I 073. Although the Bishop court referenced the f(>rum-i.e., "in-school expressions 
which suggest the school's approval"-rather than the type of speech at issue in Hazelwood, id. 
at I 074, and expressly disclaimed reliance on Tinker because it "involve[ d] students, not 
teachers," id. at I 073, the court's borrowed standard only addressed "why Hazelwood permits 
regulation of teacher speech . while ignoring the how." See Karen C. Daly, Balanci11;_1J Act: 
Teachers' Classroom Speech aud the First Amendmmt, 30 J.L. & Enuc. I, 14 (2001). The 
Bishop court, like many others, "simply assume[ d J that the Supreme Court standard [in 
Hazelwood], crafted to restrict student speech, should apply equally to teachers." See id. 
Indeed, the court's justif!cation fix its application of the Hazelwood standard-"insofar as it 
covers the extent to which an institution may limit in-school expressions which suggest the 
schools approval"-tails to address how application to teachers might be different. See Bishop, 
926 F.2d at 1074. 
Currently, this trend of analogizing to student cases results in more restrictive treatment 
of teacher in-class speech. See Daly, supra at 16 ("As interpreted by the lower courts, 
HazelJVood is increasingly hostile to the idea of teachers as reasonably autonomous 
professionals."). But if the tide turned, and courts began cnt()J"cing broader protection t<>r the 
speech rights of teachers ir. the classroom, courts may analogize to Barnette in negative speech 
rights cases to extend even fi.trther protections to teacher speech. Because such a sea change is 
unlikely, this Comment advocates a separate reasonable accommodation analysis to incre,1se 
protection tor the negative speech rights of teachers. 
25. Kari M. Dahlin, Note, Actions Speak Louder than Thought,-: The CmJJtitutiouallv 
Q;mtionable Reach of the Minnesota CLE Elimination of Bias Rcquiremmt, 84 lvli:--.:N. L. REV. 
1725, 1736-37 (2000) ("Doctrinal uncertainty also permeates compelled speech cases bcuuse 
the Court applies a variety of analytical methods in reaching negative tree speech decisions."); 
Leora Harpaz, Justice Jackson's Flalf Salute Le._ffacy: '!he Supreme Court Strugqles to Protect 
Intellectual IndiPidualism, 64 TEX. L. REv. 817, 902 (1986) ("It is clear that the Supreme 
Court's approach to the [F]irst [A]mendment problem of compelled expression ,md 
association is neither consistent nor adequate."). Professor Harpaz finds the Supreme Court's 
approach inadequate because it fails to distinguish between invasions of first Amendment 
rights that chill the expression of diverse ideas and "the less worrisome f(mn of invasion" 
aHecting only the rights of the individual complaining. See Harpaz, supra. 
26. Sec Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 ( 1977) ("Compelling the affirmative act 
of a t1ag salute lin Barnette] involved a more serious infringement upon personal liberties than 
the passive act of carrying the state motto on a license plate [in Wooley!, but the ditlcrence is 
essentially one of degree."); .ree also Harpaz, supra note 25, at 913 (observing that the Court's 
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distinctions," as some critics have advocated,27 it may determine that 
there are vital constitutional principles connecting teachers and 
students on this issue. For instance, as Justice Jackson recognized in 
Barnette, the fact that school officials "are educating the young for 
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional 
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at 
its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our 
government as mere platitudes. " 28 It may be confusing for students 
to realize that their minds are free, but their teachers' are not. 
III. THE PALMER COURT SIDESTEPPED THE ISSUE OF NEGATIVE 
SPEECH RIGHTS 
As one of the few negative speech rights cases set in the 
classroom, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Palmer effectively 
eviscerated any claim to negative free speech rights by teachers. 
What's more, the court did so without any meaningful discussion of 
negative speech rights. Under Palmer, speech of any kind, afErmative 
or negative, is not protected when it departs from the prescribed 
curriculum of the school, and there is no need to weigh the teacher's 
interest against the interests of her employer. That said, the court 
appropriately recognized the interest of parents and students in the 
learning process that might be forfeited through per se protection of 
negative speech rights for teachers. 
Palmer involved a kindergarten teacher's refusal to abide by the 
prescribed curriculum related to patriotic matters, including 
participation in the Pledge of Allegiance, patriotic songs, and the 
celebration of some national holidays. 29 As a faithful member of the 
Jehovah's Witnesses religion, the teacher claimed that such 
participation would violate her religious beliefs. 30 In its short 
opinion, the court framed the issue not as whether the public school 
teacher had any cognizable negative speech rights, but as whether 
she was "free to disregard the prescribed curriculum concerning 
patriotic matters when to conform to the curriculum she claims 
decisions in the wake of Wooley "reflect an etlort to draw a line somewhere, but ... this dl<)rt 
was etlcctuated more by seeing t:lctual ditlcrcnces than by making principled distinctions"). 
27. See, CJf., Harpaz, supra note 25, at 913. 
28. W Va. State Rd. ofEduc., 319 U.S. 624,637 (1943). 
29. Palmer v. Bd. of Educ., 603 1'.2d 1271, 1272 (7th Cir. 1979). 
30. !d. 
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would conflict with her religious principles. " 11 
Having recast the issue to f(xus on authority over the 
curriculum, and not on the teacher's individual rights, the Palmer 
court rejected any claim by the teacher to negative speech rights in 
the classroom by citing case law that establishes strict limits on a 
teacher's right to engage in speech that conflicts with curriculum. 
The majority first cited Epperson P. Arkansas,32 in which the Supreme 
Court recognized "that the states possess an undoubted right so 
long as not restrictive of constitutional guarantees to prescribe the 
curriculum for their public schools. " 33 In the majority's view, 
PlaintifFs free speech claim importuned "an exception to that 
general curriculum rule" 34 rather than a cognizable constitutional 
right that would merit at least a balancing of the interests invoh·ed. 
In keeping with its focus on the curriculum, the Palmer court then 
relied on case law to hold, for example, that "the First Amendment 
was not a teacher license for uncontrolled expression at variance vvith 
established curricular content. " 35 However, the court biled to 
discuss in any meaningful way the existence or extent of a teacher's 
negative speech rights in the classroom. 36 In fact, as noted in the 
introduction above, the three principal cases cited as authority for 
the court's holding involved affirmatipe teacher expression in 
conflict with the prescribed school curriculum. 37 
Moreover, the court dismissed any precedential value in cases 
that did involve negative speech rights at school because these cases 
did not address the "specific issue"- curriculum control-as ddined 
31. Id. The Palmer court's successful rctraming of the central issue in the c.tsc un be 
contirrned simply by consulting a compendious maimtream cduc.ltion l.m tre.nise, \\·hich 
characterizes the case as "holding that teachers may not te.tch outside the curriculum and that 
the curriculum is to be set by the school board." Ro:-:r-;A (;REH SU1NEIIlER, Elll'CATIO:--; 
LAW: fiRST AMENDMENT, DUE PROCESS AND D!SCRh\11:-:AriON I JTil;ATI<l~ § 2: II-i (2004 ). 
32. 393 u.s. 97 (1961-1). 
33. Palmer, 603 f.2d at 1272-73 (citing Eppcmm, 393 U.S .. tt 107.). 
34. ld. at 1273. 
35. I d. at 1273 (discussing the court's own holding in Clark Jl. Holmes, 474 E 2d 928 
(7th C:ir. 1972) ). 
36. The court did mention in passing that "[ e ]xtraordinarl' cth.>rts were made to 
accommodate plaintiff's religious be!icts at her particular school .1nd elsewhere in the svstcm, 
but it could not reasonably be accomplished." Id. ctt 1272. Howe\'er, the court bilcd to 
describe these efforts or e\'aluate them in light of the tc.Khcr'.s negatil''e speech rights, and did 
not hold that such efforts at reasonable accommodation were legally required of the school 
administration of school board. 
37. I d. at 1272-73; J'Cf also cases cited supra note 7. 
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by the court."x In these cases involving negative speech rights at 
school, courts upheld the right of students to refuse "to participate 
in a patriotic pledge contrary to their beliefs"39 and held that a 
"teacher could not be dismissed for her silent refusal to participate in 
her school's daily flag ceremonies."40 In discussing the latter case, the 
Palmer court made sure to underscore how the Second Circuit 
"carefully indicated that through its holding it did not mean to limit 
the traditionally broad discretion that has always rested with local 
school authorities to prescribe curriculum."41 
Rather than engaging in an examination of whether and to what 
degree protection for negative speech rights should extend to 
teachers in the classroom setting, the court reverted to analysis of the 
issue as it had defined it: whether a teacher can deviate from 
prescribed curriculum. focusing on unauthorized deviation from 
curriculum as a significant factor is no doubt appropriate. However, 
curriculum control is not the only factor; the court conspicuously 
ignored any specific substantive discussion of a teacher's negative 
speech rights, or even more general discussion of negative speech 
rights in the classroom context. 
The Palmer court docs, however, appropriately recognize the 
significant interest of parents and students in the learning process-
though it couches discussion of this interest in overblown criticism at 
the teacher's expense. Specifically, the court charges that by ignoring 
the prescribed curriculum, the "plaintiff would deprive her students 
of an elementary knowledge and appreciation of our national 
heritage. "42 Allowing plaintiffs to selectively teach from the patriotic 
curriculum would provide students with "a distorted and unbalanced 
view of our country's history. "43 Additionally, the court observed 
that "[p Jarents have a vital interest in what their children are 
3il. Palmer, 603 1'.2d at 1273. 
39. Id. (citing W.Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)). 
40. Id. (citing Russo v. Cent. Sch. Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972)). The Palmer 
court easily distinguished Russo by stating that, unlike Ms. Palmer, "[Ms. Russo's] job was not 
to teach patriotic matters to children, but to teach art." ld. 
41 !d. 
42. !d. at 1274. The Court's unflattering appraisal of the teacher's behavior goes even 
ti.mher, perhaps re\·ealing its institutional bias as a product of the times: "In this unsettled 
world, although we hope it will not come to pass, some of the students may be called upon in 
some way to defend and protect our democratic system and Constitutional rights, including 
plaintitrs religious treed om. That will demand a bit of patriotism." ld. 
43. !d. 
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taught," and this interest is protected through adherence to the 
prescribed curriculum.44 While consistent with the court's complete 
dismissal of the teacher's negative speech rights, the court's defense 
of the students' right to learn the curriculum is not entirely 
misplaced. Any protection for teacher negative speech rights must 
balance these rights against a student's interest in the learning 
process. 
In sum, the Palmer court laid down a simple, bright-line 
analysis-or dismissal-of negative teacher speech rights: where 
those in authority to prescribe curriculum in schools have spoken, 
government can compel teacher adherence to the program without 
any regard for the teacher's deeply held personal or religious beliefs 
that may conflict with the curriculum. On a positive note, Palmer 
vigorously protects the important and unignorable interests of 
parents and students in the learning process. Additionally, this rule 
provides predictability and discourages lawsuits by aggrieved 
teachers. In spite of these beneficial results, the rule is fatally flawed 
in that it effectively strips teachers of their First Amendment right to 
be silent and compels them to speak as required or face discipline-
all without any substantive discussion of their negative speech rights. 
IV. THE FLAWED BUT HELPFUL SCHOOL SPEECH PRECEDENTS 
Beyond the narrow confines of Palmer, courts rely upon four 
Supreme Court cases involving free speech rights in the school 
setting when analyzing teacher in-class speech: ( l) Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District, which famously 
declared that students and teachers could invoke First Amendment 
protections at school;45 ( 2) Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 
which held that schools can restrict "school-sponsored expressive 
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns" ;46 ( 3) Pickering v. Board of Education, which 
established a balancing test to weigh "the interests of the teacher, as 
a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern [against] 
the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency 
of the public services it performs through its employees";47 and ( 4) 
44. Id. 
45. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,506 (1969). 
46. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeicr, 484 U.S. 260, 273 ( 1988). 
47. Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563,568 (1968). 
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Garcetti v. Ceballos, which adds an additional threshold rule that 
"when public employees make statements pursuant to their official 
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline. " 48 
While helpful in identifying the values and boundaries of First 
Amendment protection for teachers, none of these cases provides a 
comprehensive and directly applicable approach to negative speech 
rights. This problem is exacerbated by wide disagreement among 
courts as to which of the available frameworks should be applied to 
teacher in-class speech cases,49 and by the fact that none of the 
current tests applied by courts are well-suited for the job. Though 
limited in applicability, these cases serve to underscore the most 
significant considerations that should be addressed in developing a 
distinct approach to negative speech rights. These considerations 
include the teacher's claim to speech rights at school, the 
government's pedagogical concern for the school curriculum, the 
distinction between speaking as a public employee or as a citizen, the 
distinction between speaking on a matter of public or private 
concern, and the need for efficient operation of public schools. 
A. Tinker)s Overarching Principle 
Since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District,50 lower courts 
analyzing free speech rights in the public school context have 
parroted that decision's most famous line: "It can hardly be argued 
that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 51 Read 
uncritically, the Court's broad language appears to give broad 
48. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,421 (2006). 
49. Daly, supra note 24, at 15~17. Even before the advent of Garcetti's additional 
threshold review, Daly describes a dramatic split in the lower courts: "The Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, "-'inth, and D.C. Circuits apply Pickering, while the First, Second, Seventh, Eighth, and 
Tenth Circuits employ Hazelwood in their analysis of teachers' in-class speech rights." Id. at 
16. 
50. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503. 
51. Id. at 506. For example, see Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1072 (11th Cir. 
1991) ("While neither teachers nor students 'shed their constitutional rights to [free speech] at 
the schoolhouse gate[,]' the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its 
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the 
speech of the citizenry in general." (citations omitted)). 
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protection to teacher speech rights. But the Court further held that 
the Constitution protected these rights only to the extent that the 
teacher's speech "did not disrupt the educational process or invade 
the rights of othcrs." 52 The Tinker Court stopped short of outlining 
the preCise analytical relationship between these competing 
interests. 53 
As the boundaries have been drawn in Tinker's wake, teacher 
speech protection has been more promise than practical reality. In 
spite of the seemingly strong support f()r protected speech rights in 
schools adopted by the Tinker Court, teachers have generally found 
that where in-class speech is concerned, they arc still bound by the 
"unchallenged dogma ... that a public employee [has l no right to 
object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment-
including those which restricted the exercise of constitutional 
rights. " 54 Indeed, some commentators argue that the various 
analytical frameworks applied by courts to determine the extent of 
teacher affirmative free speech rights in the classroom "provide[] 
inadequate protection . . . and result[] in excessive restrictions on 
classroom speech." 55 This is certainly true when compared with the 
52. Ronald D. vVenkart, Public School Curriwlum a1td the Free Spach Rij71Jts o(Tcac/;crs, 
214 Enn. L. REP. I (2006). 
53. Id. 
54. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 ( 1983). This represents the strict view of 
employee fi·ec speech rights p.1ssed down by Oliver Wendell Holmes while serving on the 
Supreme judicial Court of Massachusetts: "[A policeman J 111<1\' h,n-c a comtituti011.1l right to 
t:lik politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policcm.m." J'vlcAulitfc \'. Ma\'or of l\e\1· 
Jkdf(mi, 29 N.E. 517,517 (Mass. 1892), afm~qatiou rrCI~qniz.cd bv Pereira v. C:omm'r of Soc. 
Sen·s., 733 l\.E.2d 112 (Mass. 2000). One commentator has proposed a rcconcq1ttuliution 
of the strict Holmesian theory in the tc>nll of an "intcrnaljextenul model," which .1pplics the 
Holmesian theory to "all matters occurring on the job," but aft(mis "the s.lnJC degree of 
protection enjovcd by speakers who arc not government emplovccs" t(Jr all m.1ttcrs occurring 
outside the job context. Randy J. Kozel, Rrconccpwalizin,q Public Emplovcc SpudJ, 99 N\\'. L:. 
L. REV. 1007, 1044 (2005). In other words, "a 'citizen' with powcrtlil fi·cc speech prntcctions 
becomes an 'employee' subject to cmplover speech restrictions the moment she hegins work." 
!d. 
55. E.g., Daly, supra note 24, at 2. Daly's article was published prior to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Garcctti 1'. Ceballos, in which the Court held that "when public cmplo\'Ccs 
make statements pursuant to their otficial duties, the cmplovccs arc nor speaking as citizcm lrlr 
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution docs not insul.nc their comnumications !rom 
employer discipline." 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). It is hard to sec how this decision would 
broaden speech rights in the classroom, and, in bet, education and bw scholars \\ho ha\T 
written on the effect of Garcctti conclude that "most signals ,1rc to the conrran·." Sa Martha 
M. McCarthy & Suzanne E. Eckes, Silwcc in tbc Halln>av.r: '!he Impact of<.;.li'Cctti ,. Ccb.Jllos 
011 Public School Educ£ltors, 17 B.l!. l't:H. INT. L.). 209, 219 (200R); sa also Alison Lima, 
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broad language of the Tinker Court. But Tinker, at least in rhetorical 
if not practical terms, gave voice to the principle of First Amendment 
speech rights t<x teachers. 
B. Pickering ':s Balancing 'Test 
The first installment of more specific guidance arrived with the 
Supreme Court's decision in Pickering, which established "the 
t(mndation of modern public employee speech jurisprudence. " 56 
Pickcrin __ q involved a public school teacher who was tired f(x sending 
a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the school board and 
superintendent for their handling of past proposals to raise revenue 
f()r the schools. 57 Justice Marshall described the Court's difficult task 
in simple terms: "The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance 
between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting 
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an 
employer, in promoting the cfliciency of the public services it 
pcrt(mns through its cmployccs." 5~ 
In applying the test, the Court first determined that the teacher's 
speech touched on a matter of public concern, and then balanced the 
intcrc~t of the teacher in v\Titing the letter against the interest of the 
government in promoting ctlicient operation of the school. 59 
Ultimately, the Court held that the teacher's dismissal was improper 
because his interest in making the critical comments outweighed the 
government's interest in restricting him.('0 The Pickerin;_q test thus 
functions in two steps. first, the court determines whether the 
teacher's speech involves a matter of public concern; if not, then the 
government can restrict it outright. 61 If the speech docs involve a 
S/JrddiliJJ First Antmdlllmt Rzqhts at thr Clas.crormt noor?: '!7JC fj]rcts ofl;arcetti mtd Mayer 1111 
fcduwtio11 i11 l'ublic Schools, lo <..;Hl. lvL\SO~ L. REV. 173, 173 (200/l) !concluding that 
"recent c,"e l.m· 'ugge't' that public school te.1chcrs mav indeed lose their first Amendment 
t·ights upon entLTing their cl.1"rooms" ); sec also i'vlartha M. McCartin·, Garcetti \'. Ceb.1llos: 
A11ot!Jcr Hurdlc.fin·l'llblic buplo\'CC.f, 210 FlllTC. L. REI'. ll67, R84 (200o) (identif)·ing "sincere 
conccrm that potenti.1l \\·histlchlo\\Tr' will conclude the\' must make a difticult choice between 
clCting cH.:L·ording tO their COI1SCiCI1CCS Of keeping their jobs~'). 
S6. Ko/cl, Jlljlm note 54, ,lt I 0 IS. 
S7. Pickering,· Bd. ofEduc., :Nl ll.S. 563, Soo (19o8). 
5/l. !d. at 568. 
59. Jd. ,\t 5(>9-7!1. 
60. I d . • lt 574. The C\lurt .1lso based its ruling on the bet that there was no proof' that 
the tc.Kher kn<l\1 inglv "r reddc"lv made the blse statements contained in his letter. I d. 
61. !d. ,\t 5(,1'; (noting th,n teachers may not be "compelled to relinquish the first 
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matter of public concern, then the court must balance the interest of 
the teacher-as-citizen against the interest of the government-as-
employer.62 
But the Court left unresolved the scope of PickerinJf's 
applicability, undefined the precise nature of the government's 
interest as an employer, and unanswered the question of what 
qualifies as a matter of public concern. Lower courts have since 
broadened the scope of Pickering, applying it to cases involving 
speech by teachers inside the workplace or classroom. 63 The Supreme 
Court itself has enhanced the Pickering definition of government's 
interest-that is, "promoting the dficiency of the public services it 
perf(xms through its employees"64-with facilitating "the efficient 
function of [public employers') operations,"65 and avoiding 
disruption to "work, personnel relationships, or the speaker's job 
performance" inasmuch as these "detract from the public employer's 
function. "06 
In Connick v. Myers, 67 the Supreme Court attempted to outline 
the contours of what qualifies as a matter of public concern under 
the Pickering test.68 The Court concluded that speech involves a 
matter of public concern when it relates to "any matter of political, 
Amendment rights they would otherwise enjov as citizens to comment on matters of public 
interest"). 
62. !d. At least one commentator has attacked the logical imbalance at work in the 
Court's f()rmulation in that a teacher found to be speaking as a private citizen has her interest 
weighed against the interest of government-as-employer, rather than government-as-sm-creign. 
Scog Hun Jo, The Le._qal Standard on the Swpc of Teachers' Frrc Speech Rzqht.< in the School 
Stttit~q, 31 T.L. & Enuc:. 413, 41:-l-19 (2002). If the teacher is treated as a citizen, it would 
be more appropriate and bir to balance her interest against the government-.Js-sovereign, 
giving the teacher a better shot at constitutional protection because government-as-sovereign 
is more limited in its ability to restrict. I d. 
63. See supra note I, with the exception of Mayer JJ. Monroe Cotmtv Community School 
Corp., 474 r.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007), in which the Seventh Circuit relied on the Garcctti 
standard. 
64. l'ickerirt;_q, 391 U.S. at 568. 
65. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 3X4 (!9X7). 
66. Id. at 3XX. 
67. 461 U.S. 13:-l ( !983). Interesting bit of trivia: the Connick in Connick P. Mvers 
refers to Harry Connick, Sr., District Attorney f(lr Orleans Parish in Louisiana, and perhaps 
better known as the lather of Harry Connick, Jr. 
6:-l. Id. at 140 (noting that the Court is returning to the PickerinH problem again to 
"consider whether the first and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the discharge of a state 
employee f()r cir•:ulating a questionnaire concerning internal ot1ice athirs"). 
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social, or other concern to the community"6Y as determined by the 
"content, form, and context of a given statement." 70 Refining the 
PickerinLq test's initial threshold question, the Connick Court held as 
follows: 
[W]hen a public employee speaks not as a Citizen upon 
matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon 
matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual 
circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate t(xum in 
which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by 
a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's 
behavior. 71 
Rather than clarity the Pickering test, the Connick contribution 
has resulted in further confusion. For example, some courts, 
expressly relying on Connick's development of Pickering, have 
treated the employee's role-i.e., as a private citizen or public 
employee-in making the statement as the determinative factor in 
the threshold analysis.72 Other courts explicitly disagree with this 
interpretation, f(xusing instead on whether the actual content of the 
speech touched on a matter of public concern. 73 In advocating this 
latter approach, the Sixth Circuit directly criticized the former 
approach as a gross misreading of Connick: "As the Supreme Court 
made clear in its analysis, however, the key question is not whether a 
person is speaking in his role as an employee or a citizen, but 
vvhether the employee's speech in fact touches on matters of public 
69. Id. at 146. 
70. !d. at 147-4X. 
71. Id.atl47. 
72. See, CB., Boring\' Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368-69 (4th 
Cir. 19981 (holding that "fsjincc plainritrs dispute . . is nothing more than an ordinary 
<:mplovment dispute, it docs not constitute protected speech and has no first Amendm<:nt 
protection" under the Connick public concern threshold); Kirkland v. Northside lndep. Sch. 
Dist., 890 l'.2d 794, 79X-99 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that under the Pickerir~q test as dctined 
lw Connick, teacher speech warrants "protected status if the words or conduct arc conveved by 
the teacher in his role as a citizen and not in his role as an employee of the school district"). 
73. Sec, CB., Cockrcl v. Shclbv County Sch. Dist., 270 l'.3d 1036, 1051-52 (6th Cir. 
200 I ) (holding that a teacher's presentation on the benefits of industrial hemp survived the 
Cmmick threshold test because although the teacher "was speaking in her role as an employee . 
. . the content of her speech . . most certainly involved matters related to the political and 
socic1l concern of the community, as opposed to mere matters of private interest"). 
719 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
concern. "74 Mter all, to answer the "public concern" threshold 
question on the basis of the employee's role in speaking "essentially 
gives a teacher no right to freedom of speech when teaching students 
in a classroom, for the very act of teaching is what the employee is 
paid to do."75 
Given these serious analytical shortcomings and principled 
disagreements, the Pickering test, along with its Connick 
amendment, provides a poor framework in which to analyze cases of 
teacher in-class speech-although, as shown above, this has not 
stopped courts from trying?6 To begin, application of Pickering to 
in-class speech is inappropriate because Pickering involved teacher 
speech outside of the classroom.77 Teacher instructional speech is 
fundamentally different than the external speech at issue in Pickering. 
As such, the Pickering test both ignores "the right of students to 
hear diverse viewpoints in the classroom" and "fails to account for 
the importance of social value education and exposure to diverse 
opinions. "78 The analogy to Pickering breaks down even further 
when considered in relation to a case involving the negative speech 
rights of teachers in the classroom. In dual contrast, Pickering 
addressed affirmative speech outside of the school context. 
Moreover, the inclusion of disruption as part of the 
governmental interest to be weighed against the employee's interest 
in speaking amounts to "little more than the constitutionalization of 
a heckler's veto. " 79 Even assuming that a teacher's instructional 
speech touches on a matter of public concern and thus passes 
Connick's initial threshold, the government can restrict the speech 
simply because it causes sufficient disruption by offending too many 
students-or, more significantly, parents. The interests of parents 
and students in the learning process are obviously valuable, and 
teachers must be "somewhat beholden to the views of parents in the 
community."80 But this should not automatically place parents' 
74. Id. at 1052 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 148-49). 
75. /d.at105l. 
76. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text. 
77. See Kuhn, supra note 14, at 1008 ("The most important criticism of applying 
Pickeri11;_11 to instructional speech cases is that the facts of the case do not exactly correspond to 
teacher speech within the classroom."). 
78. Id. at 1009. 
79. Kozel, mpra note 54, at 1019. 
80. Mdzerv. Bd. ofEduc., 3361-'.3d 185, 199 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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concerns ahead of other competing interests, including the teacher's 
right to speak and the student's right to hear diverse viewpoints. And 
this heckler's veto is even more dangerous to the protection of 
diverse viewpoints in the context of negative speech rights. 
Generally, the prescribed school curriculum reflects the majority 
views of the community, while negative speech rights are most likely 
to be asserted by teachers who espouse minority views. 81 
The "public concern" threshold, however, represents the most 
problematic aspect of the Pickering test as applied to in-class teacher 
speech rights. first, by distilling the threshold inquiry to a narrow 
f(xus on the public or private nature of speech, or on the teacher's 
role in speaking as a private citizen or public employee, courts ignore 
the broader effects and purposes of teacher in-class speech. These 
include, for example, "giv[ ing] students ideas that may be part of the 
public debate and educat[ ing] students about the process of rational 
discourse. "82 In that sense, even when a teacher speaks as a public 
employee on matters not of public concern, "it still has a significant 
[and public] ctlect on society by instructing students on the process 
of public debate and exposing students to ideas they might 
encounter therein. " 83 This too should count as touching on a matter 
of public concern. Teacher in-class speech implicates these and other 
"special concerns" that are not adequately addressed through the 
Pickerittq/ Cmmick distinction between public and private. 84 
These issues are even more pronounced in the context of 
negative speech rights in the classroom, effectively rendering 
unworkable the Pickering test. After all, how should courts 
categorize a teacher's rcft1sal to speak for deeply personal or religious 
reasons? In Connick, the Supreme Court framed the choice as 
between a private citizen speaking on matters of public concern and 
a public employee speaking on matters of private interest. 85 But a 
teacher asserting negative speech rights docs not fit in either 
XI. See, CJf., Palmer v. Ed. of Educ., 603 !'.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1979) (involving a 
member of the jehm·ah 's Witnesses bith asserting negative speech rights by refusing to teach 
wh.n the court t(nmd to be mainstream, "traditional" patriotic material in order to avoid 
'iolation of her religious beliefs). 
X2. Kuhn,.rupranotc 14,at 1009. 
X3. !d. 
X4. Sec Gregory A. Clarick, Note, l'ublic School Teachers tmd the First Amendment: 
l'roterti11H the R(qht to Teach, 65 N.Y. U. L. REv. 693, 702 ( 1990). 
X5. Connick v. Myers,461 U.S. 138,147 (1983). 
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category. On one hand, if we focus on the teacher's perspective, it 
would seem that the teacher "speaks" as a private citizen on a matter 
of private interest. On the other hand, if we focus more broadly on 
the students' perspective in the classroom, the teacher arguably 
"speaks" as a public employee on a matter of public concern. Courts 
applying the Pickering test to a teacher's assertion of negative speech 
rights would no doubt deem the personal nature of the speech as 
existing outside of the scope of cognizable "public concern." But 
this docs nothing to alleviate the troublesome analytical issues posed 
by such a case.x6 
In spite of these deficiencies, the Pickering test succeeds in 
highlighting several of the major considerations that must be 
addressed in a distinct standard for negative speech cases. These 
include the government's interest in both promoting the efficient 
operation of schools and avoiding disruption to the students' 
learning environment, the parents' interest in the education of their 
children, and the need to broadly address the nature of the teacher's 
speech. 
C. Hazelwood )s ((Pedagogical Concern v Test 
As an analogy to cases involving teacher in-class speech, the 
Hazelwood "pedagogical concern" test presents a completely 
ditlcrcnt set of issues. Unlike Pickering, which involved speech 
outside of the school,87 Hazelwood involved speech inside the 
classroom.xx At the same time, however, unlike Pickering, which 
il6. Indeed, if the emphasis in the Pickerirtl!/Connick threshold is on whether the 
teacher's "words arc those of a detached citizen and not an interested employee," "' 
Professor Jo argues, Jo, supra note 62, ;1t 417, then it would appear that, if anything, teacher 
negative speech rights should be singled out f(>r protection as the speech of a "detached 
citizen.'' The situation is t[Irthcr complicated by the Cormick Court's disclaimer to strict 
applic•tion of the public/private distinction: "We do not suggest, however, that Myers' 
speech, even if not touching upon a matter of public concern, is totally beyond the protection 
of the first Amendment." Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. Even if viewed as purely private speech, .1 
teacher's exercise of negative speech rights may still warrant protection as if the teacher were a 
private citizen. 
il7. Sec Pickering,._ Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 566 ( 1968). 
88. Sec Hcizclwood Sch. Dist. \'. Kuhlmcicr, 484 U.S. 260,262 (1988). In Hw:,dll'ood, a 
high school principal removed two pages of the student-written and -edited high school 
newspaper prior to publication because he objected to two stories on those pages-one on 
teen pregnancy, the other on divorce. !d. at 263-64. The principal feared that the pregnant 
students featured in the teen pregnancy article might be identified, and that some of the 
subject matter would be inappropriate for younger students. !d. at 263. He was also concerned 
722 
705 A Teacher)s Right to Remain Silent 
involved teacher speech rights,89 Hazelwood involved student speech 
rights. 90 The dispute in Hazelwood centered on the school's removal 
of questionable material from the student-edited school newspaper 
published as part of a journalism course at the school. 91 Students 
who worked on the newspaper sued, claiming a violation of their 
First Amendment rights. 92 In deciding the case, the Supreme Court 
held "that educators do not offend the First Amendment by 
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student 
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their 
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. " 93 
Many lower courts have applied the Hazelwood "pedagogical 
concern" principle to teacher in-class speech as well,94 so that any 
"expression representing the public school can be censored f(x 
legitimate pedagogical reasons. "95 In fact, this is now the dominant 
approach to teacher in-class speech cases among the lower courts,96 
resulting in a decline in the success rate of teachers alleging 
violations of their First Amendment rights. 97 The Tenth Circuit, 
which first incorporated the Hazelwood analysis in teacher speech 
cases,98 saw no problem with the fact that the Hazelwood case itself 
that parents who were criticized by a student in the divorce article did not have an opportunity 
to respond to the comments or consent to publication. Id. Because he believed there was not 
enough time to make the necessary changes before the scheduled publication date and that any 
delay might jeopardize the newspaper's appearance bd(>re school was out, the principal 
decided to eliminate the two pages containing these stories. Id. at 263-64. 
89. See Pickerinlf, 391 U.S. at 566. 
90. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262. 
91. I d. at 263-64. 
92. Id. at 264. 
93. Id. at 273. 
94. See, Clf., Conward v. Cambridge Sch. Comm., 171 F3d 12, 23 (lst Cir. 1999) 
(holding that while members of the school community do not shed their First Amendment 
rights, school oHicials can restrict school speech through regulations reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns); Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 f.2d 773, 777 (lOth Cir. 
1991) (applying the Hazelwood standard in light of "the special characteristics of a classroom 
environment"); Bishop v. Aranov, 926 F.2d I 066, 1078 (II th Cir. 1991) (holding that a 
University can restrict teacher classroom conduct when such restrictions are "issued under its 
authority to control curriculum"); Roberts v. Madigan, 921 f.2d 1047, 1057 (lOth Cir. 
1990) (holding that any school speech that f(mns "part of the school curriculum or school-
sponsored activities" is subject to greater restriction than personal speech). 
95. McCarthy & Eckes, supra note 55, at 214. 
96. Kuhn, supra note l4,at 1012. 
97. Id. at !Oll-12. 
98. Id. at 10!0. 
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involved not teacher but student speech: "We find no reason here to 
draw a distinction between teachers and students where classroom 
expression is concerned. "'N 
Not surprisingly, critics of the Hazelwood test aim squarely at this 
very distinction between teachers and students-and they do not 
mince words. One commentator, addressing the Tenth Circuit's 
approach specifically, declares it "as ominous as it is questionable" 
that the Hazelwood test "was developed in the context of student 
speech in supervised learning settings." 100 In other words, it is highly 
objectionable that a test geared toward exerting more control in 
student speech cases should be applied to exert "greater 
administrative control in teacher speech cases." 101 Another 
commentator takes great umbrage that teacher speech would be 
treated the same as student speech, even charging that Hazelwood, as 
applied by courts to teacher speech rights, results in "the subtle 
infantilization of teachers. " 102 Hazelwood effectively gives school 
officials "the power to treat employees as if they were unruly 
children. " 103 Instead, courts should recognize that "[ t ]eachers, as 
well as administrators and much more so than students, have a stake 
in defining 'legitimate pedagogical concerns.'""14 Though perhaps 
overstated, the practical implications of these critical observations 
raise a more serious problem: because "teachers arc tar more likely to 
engage in curricular speech than students," application of Hazelwood 
by courts to teacher speech cases "strip[ s J a far greater proportion of 
teacher speech of constitutional protection, possibly restricting the 
universe of protected teacher speech within the schools to 
conversations in the teachers' lounge or 'random comments' in the 
classroom." 105 
It is precisely for these reasons that the Hazelwood "pedagogical 
concern" test fails as a workable standard for teacher negative speech 
rights in the classroom. Certainly, a teacher's assertion of negative 
99. Roberts, 921 r.2d at 1057. 
100. E. Edmund Reutter Jr., Academic Freedom Advisory: Be Warv of the Lmtlf Arm of 
Kuhlmcier, 89 EDUC:. L. REP. 347,353 (1994). 
101. Kuhn,supranotcl4,atl020. 
102. See Daly, supra note 24, at 16. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at IS (quoting Hazelwood SelL Dist. v. Kuhlmeicr, 484 U.S. 260,273 (1988)). 
105. Id. at 41-42 (citing Zykan v. Warsaw Cmty. Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th 
Cir. 1980)). 
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speech rights through refusal to teach the prescribed curriculum 
presents the school with a legitimate pedagogical concern. This 
approach, however, raises two interrelated problems. first, 
HazellVood involved affirmative speech by students. Applying this 
same standard to negative speech by a teacher seems to ignore the 
difkrent character of speech. Second, and more significantly, as the 
critics lament, application of Hazelwood to teacher speech cases puts 
the teacher on constitutional par with students. And yet, unlike the 
teacher in Palmer, whose negative speech rights were not protected 
by the First Amendment when she refused to teach patriotic material 
because she was a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses/ 06 students 
who assert negative speech rights are protected in nearly identical 
situations. 107 That said, Hazelwood, like Palmer, recognized a 
significant value that must be addressed in an approach to negative 
speech rights for teachers: the vital importance of the prescribed 
curriculum to the learning process and the educational system. 
D. Garcctti )s Additional ccOfficial Duties)) Threshold Requirement 
While the foundational case in the area of public employee 
speech rights involved the exercise of teacher speech rights, 108 
teachers arc often subject to analytical standards developed in cases 
arising in the broader context of public employment outside of 
education. 109 The Supreme Court's Garcetti decision laid down the 
most recent and most significant of these standards. In Garcetti, a 
deputy district attorney claimed that he was reassigned, transferred, 
and denied a promotion on the basis of a memo he wrote to his 
supervisor communicating his opinion that an affidavit used to 
obtain a search warrant in a case he was handling contained serious 
misrepresentations. 110 Rather than examine the case under the 
106. See Palmer v. Bd. ofEduc., 603 F.2d 1271, 1272 (7th Cir. 1979). 
107. SeeW. Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943). 
108. See Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
109. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (involving speech made by a 
deputy district attorney relating to his official duties); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 ( 1983) 
(involving a state employee's circulation of a questionnaire on internal office affairs). 
110. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414-15. The deputy district attorney wrote the memo 
detailing perceived inaccuracies in the affidavit after he did not receive a satisf:Ktory 
explanation ti:om the warrant atliant. Id. at 414. His supervisor met with the sheriffs 
department to discuss the issue, and after that discussion determined that the case should go 
f(mvard in spite of the district attorney's reservations. I d. The trial court held a hearing on a 
defense motion challenging the warrant, and the defense called the district attorney to testifY 
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Pickerin._q standard as the Ninth Circuit had done in ruling f(:>r the 
cmployce, 111 the Supreme Court established a new threshold inquiry 
that must be determined before application of the Pickering 
balancing test: "We hold that when public employees make 
statements pursuant to their oftlcial duties, the employees are not 
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the 
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer 
discipline. " 112 Applying this threshold standard to the deputy district 
attorney's memo, the Court concluded that "his expressions were 
made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy" 113 and reversed the 
Ninth Circuit decision. 114 
Invoking his inner-Holmes,115 Justice Kennedy, writing for a 
narrow five-to-four majority, gave substantial-indeed, ncar total-
deference to government-as-employer in restricting speech made in 
furtherance of the employee's oflicial duties. In identifying the 
"overarching objectives" of the Court's jurisprudence on public 
employee speech, he began by stressing that "( w ]hen a citizen enters 
government service, the citizen by necessity must accept certain 
limitations on his or her freedom." 116 Although the majority 
acknowledged that society has an important interest in protecting 
speech made by public employees as citizens on matters of public 
concern, 117 Justice Kennedy's opinion focused more heavily on the 
interest of government employers in exercising a "significant degree 
of control over their employees' words and actions. " 118 The only real 
limit placed on government restriction of public employee speech is 
essentiaily toothless: restrictions imposed "must be directed at 
speech that has some potential to affect the entity's operations." 119 In 
short, Garcetti represents a bright-line approach that excludes public 
employee speech made pursuant to oftlcial duties from First 
concerning his observations. !d. at 414-15. The trial court rejected the motion. ld. at 415. 
Ill. Id.at415-16. 
112. Id. at 421. 
113. Id. 
114. !d. at 426. 
115. for a brief introduction to the ,·iew of justice Holmes on public employee speech 
rights, sec supra note 54. 
116. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (citation omitted). 
117. Sec id. 
118. !d. 
119. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Amendment protection. 120 
It remains unclear what eHcct the Garcetti decision will have on 
teacher in -class speech rights, l2l though some believe the practical 
impact may be minimal. 122 The Supreme Court's majority opinion, in 
response to concerns raised by Justice Souter in dissent, contained 
the following relevant disclaimer: "We need not, and for that reason 
do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in 
the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or 
teaching." 12 .l Many lower courts have not yet applied the new 
threshold standard to the classroom setting. The Seventh Circuit, 
however, has relied on Garcetti in holding that a teacher's expression 
of her personal views on the war in Iraq as part of class discussion 
was not constitutionally protected speech. 124 In its brief and 
conclusory opinion, the court found that "Garcetti applie[ d] 
directly" to the teacher's speech because it occurred during a 
"current-events lesson [which] was part of her assigned tasks in the 
classroom." 125 But the court's holding does not depart in the least 
from its basic deferential approach to the school system 111 
prescribing curriculum 126-an approach it also employed 111 
Palmer. 127 
As applied to teacher speech in the classroom, the Garcetti 
threshold would appear to remove Erst Amendment protection from 
all speech made by teachers as part of their job, especially in light of 
the Seventh Circuit's ruling. 128 This rigid approach effectively 
120. Sec id. at 421. 
121. McCarthy & Eckes, mpra note 55, at 224. 
122. !d. at 225 (reasoning that "public school authorities have always bad more latitude 
to censor employees' expression in the classroom than their comments on public issues made 
outside school"). 
123. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. 
124. Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 f.3d 477,480 (2007). 
125. !d. 
126. !d. ("It is enough to hold that the [flirst [Almendment docs not entitle primary 
and secondary teachers, when conducting the education of captive audiences, to cover topics, 
or advocate \"iewpoints, that depart from the curriculum adopted by the school system."). 
127. Sec Palmer v. Bd. of Educ., 603 f.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1979) ("[The school 
board has 1 in general prescribed a curriculum. There is a compdling state interest in the choice 
.md adherence to a suitable curriculum tor the benefit of our young citizens and society. It 
cannot be lcti: to individual teachers to teach what they please."). 
128. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit specifically emphasized that "the school system docs not 
'regulate' teachers' speech as much as it hires that speech." Mayer, 474 f.3d at 479. As such, 
teacher speech is by definition made in furtherance of a teacher's duties on the job. 
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"climinatc[s] any ~cmblance of tailoring rc<;trirtiuns on teacher 
speech to the interests that those restrictions serve," such as 
promoting the efficient operation of school and pre\·enting 
disruption of the learning process. 1n Indeed, some critics 
characterize the Garcetti rule as simply "an additional barrier" to 
application of the more favorable Pickerin;_q test, which would 
actually balance the teacher's interest m speaking with the 
government's interests in restricting. I.lo 
Moreover, a threshold developed in the broader context of 
employee speech may not be well suited t(>r application in the 
classroom setting. Teachers already occupy a precarious position on 
the battleground of public employee speech rights. c;iven the sheer 
volume of teacher speech required by the job, teachers are vulnerable 
to any shift toward further restriction of public employee speech. 
With the unique nature of teaching in mind, some scholars argue 
that "the speech of teachers is somehow qualitativelv different from 
that of other public employees, [thus] necessitating special 
protection."131 If strictly applied to classroom speech, the Garcetti 
rule would deny even the most basic protection available through 
Pickering. 
As with the other tests discussed in this Part, the Garcctti rule 
appears to be even less helpful in the case of negative speech rights. 
The teacher's negative speech may occur on the job, but it strains 
credulity to construe such speech as somehow being made "pursuant 
to [the teacher'sJ official duties." 102 The Garcctti majority reint(xced 
its conclusion that the deputy district attorney's memo was \\'ritten 
pursuant to his otlicial duties by reasoning that he "did not act as a 
citizen" in doing so. 133 A teacher refusing to teach discrete portions 
of the curriculum tor personal or religious reasons appears to be 
acting as a citizen, not as an employee. Garcetti thus provides little 
guidance in analyzing the negative speech rights of teachers in the 
129. Lima, supra note 55, at 192-93. 
130. See McCarthy & Eckes, supra note 55, at 21X-19. 
131 Daly, supra note 24, at 42. Daly mentions the theoretical \nHk of ,\kxandcr 
Meiklejohn, Amy Gutmann, and Charles Beard in "dneloping a basis t(Jr protection of teacher 
speech based on its unique tlmction." !d. at 42 n.235. For tl1rther discussion of these theories, 
sec Merle H. Weiner, Dirty Words in the ClaJSroom: Teachirt!f tbe Limits of the Fint 
Amendment, 66 TE~N. L. REv. 597, 653-54 ( 1999). 
132. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,421 (2006). 
133. Id.at422. 
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classroom. But, as with the other cases treated above, Garcetti does 
offer a strong perspective on the interests of the government-as-
employer in restricting employee speech that must be considered in 
f~1shioning any approach to negative speech rights. 
To review, none of the available standards applied to school 
speech rights cases seem appropriate f()r cases involving the negative 
speech rights of teachers in the classroom. At the same time, 
however, each of the cases discussed above outlines one or more of 
the important considerations that must be addressed in any attempt 
to frame a new standard. These include the following: from Tinker, 
the general notion that teachers do not abandon their first 
Amendment rights at school; from Pickering, the government's 
interest in promoting the efficient operation of schools and 
preventing disruptions, and the need to address the nature of the 
teacher's speech and the teacher's interest in speaking; from Palmer 
and Hazelwood, the vital importance of the prescribed curriculum; 
from Hazelwood, the school's interest in regulating speech that 
might be attributed to it; from Palmer and Pickering, the parents' 
interest in the prescribed curriculum and the education of their 
children; from Palmer, the students' interest in learning the 
prescribed curriculum; and, finally, from Garcetti, the government's 
interest in regulating speech by employees in carrying out their 
duties. 
V. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION OF TEACHER NEGATIVE 
SPEECH RIGHTS IN THE CLASSROOM 
This Comment proposes that school districts and school boards 
should be required to make reasonable accommodations for teachers 
who refuse to teach material that directly violates their deeply held 
and preexisting personal or religious beliefs. The following section 
defines the reasonable accommodation standard; demonstrates how 
it balances the policy considerations gleaned from Part IV's review of 
school speech rights cases and, in the process, advances important 
educational values; and discusses the possible dangers of restrictions 
on teacher negative speech rights in the classroom as an 
unconstitutional condition of employment. 
A. Defining Reasonable Accommodation 
Under the proposed reasonable accommodation standard, a 
teacher must first show that discrete curricular materials or classroom 
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actiVIties required as part of employment contradict the teacher's 
deeply held and preexisting personal or religious beliefs. Once this 
showing is made, the school district or school board must 
demonstrate that no reasonable accommodation could be made 
under the circumstances, which vary from school to school and 
district to district. 134 In some respects this standard is similar to 
Pickering's balancing test. Whether a reasonable accommodation has 
been made by school officials will still require an inquiry into the 
relative interests of each party. Schools will not be required to make 
an accommodation that undermines the eflicient operation of the 
school or disrupts the learning process to any significant degree. 135 
What changes under this analysis, however, is that the burden rests 
more squarely on school officials once a teacher has shown that the 
required speech violates the teacher's personal or religious beliefs 
against the dictates of conscience. More importantly, the reasonable 
accommodation standard ignores entirely the threshold question of 
whether the teacher is speaking as a citizen on a matter of public 
concern, or as a public employee on a matter of private interest. This 
distinction makes little sense in the context of negative speech rights. 
Although at first glance this appears to be a radical departure 
from the orthodox view of teacher speech cases, invocation of such 
protection would be limited in several important respects. First, 
teachers must give notice prior to the start of employment by 
reviewing the curriculum and informing school administrators if 
there are potential conflicts. This notice requirement serves a dual 
purpose: ( 1) facilitating early cooperative efforts between the school 
134. As such, a reasonable accommodation agreed to by one school or district cannot be 
required of another school or district when the tacts show that such an accommodation is 
unreasonable under the circumstances of the latter school or district. 
135. This notion of reasonable accommodation is borrowed-selfconsciously, though in 
stronger form-trom the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which mandated protection 
in the employment context of "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, 
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an 
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship 
on the conduct of the employer's business." § 701(j), 42 USC § 2000e(j) (2000). 
Interpreting this provision in Ansonia Roard of Education v. Philbrook, the Supreme Court 
stated that employers face an extremely low threshold, exemption for "undue hardship" 
requiring only a showing that "[ anj accommodation results in 'more than a de minimis cost' to 
the employer." 479 U.S. 60, 67 ( 1986) (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc v. Hardison, 432 
U.S. 63, 84 ( 1977) ). The version of reasonable accommodation proposed in this Comment 
has more f()rce, requiring a showing of signit!cant negative impact on the efficient operation of 
the school. 
730 
705 A Teacher)s Right to Remain Silent 
and teacher to arrive at a reasonable accommodation, and ( 2) 
ensuring that a teacher does not disrupt the school's operation by 
bringing (possibly frivolous) conflicts to light in the middle of the 
school year. Because only deeply held and preexisting personal and 
religious beliefs warrant reasonable accommodation by schools, 
teachers should vouch for the sincerity and validity of their claim by 
giving proper notice to their employer before the start of the year. 
Second, the curricular material at issue must be relatively small in 
volume and discrete. While this is obviously not a concrete, bright-
line standard, courts are well equipped to make judgments as to the 
amount of material and the substantiality of the teacher's refusal to 
teach it. If a teacher refuses to teach large portions of required 
material, a presumption arises that no reasonable accommodation 
would be possible. 136 A biology teacher, for example, could not ask 
for reasonable accommodation to avoid teaching the theory of 
evolution. 137 But an elementary school teacher might be justified in 
refusing to participate in the Pledge of Allegiance each morning, if 
the students could be taught to lead the pledge on their own, or 
with the occasional oversight of a parent, an aide, or another teacher. 
Generally, reasonable accommodation is most appropriate for minor 
routine activities, such as the flag salute, or for discrete substantive 
topics to be covered over distinct segments of time. Control over the 
former might be ceded to students or aides, while responsibility for 
the latter can be shifted to a teacher who does not object to the 
material, with the refusing teacher taking the other's place during 
that time. 138 No matter what the arrangement, reasonable 
accommodation must not alter the prescribed curriculum or deprive 
136. This appears to have been the case in Palmer 1'. Board of Education, given that the 
teacher refused to teach "any subjects having to do with love of country, the tlag or other 
patriotic matters in the prescribed curriculum." 603 F.2d 1271, 1272 (7th Cir. 1979). 
Although the court docs not require reasonable accommodation efforts by the school board, it 
docs mention that "[ e Jxtraordinary clt(Jrts were made to accommodate pbintitl's religious 
beliefs at her particular school and elsewhere in the system, but it could not reasonably be 
accomplished." Id. 
137. Cf Pcloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting 
a teacher's claim that school officials violated his First Amendment rights by I(Jrcing him to 
teach evolution). It makes little sense lcJr a teacher who feels so stronglv about certain 
curricular material to teach a subject to which that material is critical. No reasonable 
accommodation is possible in such circumstances. 
13R. Or, alternatively, the teacher and the school mav work out a lesson plan that 
depersonalizes the material. That way, the teacher would still teach the lesson, but would not 
be t(Jrced to express personal aftirmation with the principles being taught. 
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students of the opportunity to learn the material. 
Although such an approach may lead to conf1ict between a 
teacher and school oH!cials, 139 the reasonable accommodation 
standard provides both sides with incentive to cooperate. If the 
teacher is too demanding, she runs the risk of forfeiting her 
protection. If school oflicials arc too inflexible, they run the risk of a 
costly lawsuit they will likely lose. Like the Pickerin,q balancing test, 
the reasonable accommodation inquiry seeks to balance all interests 
by protecting teacher negative speech rights without disrupting the 
school's operation. 
B. Balancit"'-q Policy Considerations and Adliancing Educational 
Values 
Reasonable accommodation of teacher negative speech rights in 
the classroom effectively balances the divergent policy considerations 
and interests at stake in the determination and, by so doing, 
advances several important educational values. Providing increased 
negative speech rights protection does more than simply validate the 
teacher's right to a free mind and conscience. It also serves many 
important educational goals related to the curriculum and students' 
learning outcomes. Through this process, the reasonable 
accommodation standard achieves balance among the competing 
policy interests by granting limited negative speech rights to teachers 
without undermining the interests of government, parents, and 
students. In bet, in many \Nays it furthers those interests. 
Other than Tinker and, to a far lesser degree, Picl?ering, the 
prccedential cases relied upon to determine teacher speech rights in 
the classroom heavily bvor the government. For instance, the 
significant policy considerations discussed in HazelJrood and Garcetti 
focus almost exclusively on the government's interests. And in 
Palmer, the only case involving negative speech rights, the court 
summarily dismissed the teacher's claims in deference to the 
authority of the school board to prescribe curriculum-and did so 
with "traditional" bias. 140 Though it may seem so, adoption of a 
139. It mav also lead to an increase in latent emplovmcnt discrimination at schoob, with 
school districts avoiding or removing teachers most likch· to im·oke the reasonable 
accommodation protections. But anti-discrimination laws alrcadv cover these situations, so 
further safeguards would seem unnecessary. 
140. Sec supra text accompanying note 41. 
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reasonable accommodation standard does not simply reverse the field 
and t:wor the teacher against the government. It docs, however, seck 
to recognize and further other policy interests that do not play much 
of a role in the prevailing speech rights analysis-but not at the 
complete expense of the government's significant interests. 
Ultimately, reasonable accommodation provides much needed 
balance among the competing interests of the government, the 
teacher, the students, and the parents. 
1. Protcctirm of the _qovcrnmcnt 's internt.r 
The government essentially holds three significant interests in the 
determination of teacher negative speech rights in the classroom: ( 1) 
authority over and advancement of the prescribed curriculum; (2) 
control over expression that might be attributed to the school; and 
( 3) regulation of teacher speech to promote eftl.cient operation of~ 
and prevent disruption to, the educational system. 
Under a reasonable accommodation standard, the first and 
second interests remain intact. As discussed above, by definition an 
accommodation is not reasonable if the prescribed curriculum is 
ignored through the teacher's refusal to teach it. And given the 
personal nature of a teacher's refusal, there is little chance the 
negative speech will be attributed to the school. Indeed, the 
HazclJPood Court specifically f(xused its holding on "school-
sponsored expressive activities," which presumably excludes teacher 
negative speech of the sort at issue here. Moreover, courts applying 
HazclJPood in the context of teacher in-class speech rely on the fact 
that teacher speech is more attributable to the school than student 
speech: "VVhile a student's expression can be more readily identified 
as a thing independent of the school, a teacher's speech can be taken 
as directly and deliberately representative of the school." 141 Not so 
with the narrow negative speech rights protected under reasonable 
accommodation. 
But the government's third interest is burdened to some small 
degree by the reasonable accommodation requirement, but not in 
any manner that might have a significant deleterious effect on the 
operation of schools or the learning process. Again, by definition an 
accommodation 1s not reasonable if it reqmres significant 
141 Bishop'. AronoY, 026 f'.2d I 066, I 073 (II th Cir. I 091 ). 
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modification of existing practices and structures. The government's 
interests are generally protected in the same way as bcf(xc. 
Reasonable accommodation of negative speech rights f()r teachers in 
the classroom simply provides a narrow exception to the general 
rulc.I42 
2. Protection of the teacher)s interests 
The interest of teachers at stake m this determination is 
important and obvious: First Amendment protection f(x personal or 
religious expression. Unlike the prevailing standards applied to 
teacher in -class speech, reasonable accommodation gives teachers 
some limited measure of protection against compelled aftlrmation of 
values or beliefs inconsistent with their own. 
Additionally, reasonable accommodation gives the teacher an 
opportunity to expose her students to a different viewpoint in a non-
threatening manner. In our educational system, teachers arc charged 
with the task of preparing students to think about and analyze 
diverse viewpoints and opinions. In every classroom, the teacher tills 
a "special role as the moderator of and contributor to the 
'marketplace of ideas"' from which students learn .143 Rigid 
application of the prevailing restrictive standards deprives students of 
access to other viewpoints by silencing or compelling one of their 
primary sources. Reasonable accommodation of negative speech 
rights allows for the non-threatening expression-indeed, by 
silcnce!-of different viewpoints without undermining the core goals 
of the prescribed curriculum. After all, it seems "unfair to charge 
teachers with this awesome responsibility while simultaneously 
denying them any protection tor their classroom exprcssion." 1H 
Negative speech, as well as affirmative speech, provides a gateway of 
understanding into other perspectives that are, more than likely, not 
part of the official curriculum. In short, a reasonable accommodation 
standard assists the teacher in discharging part of her responsibility as 
the purveyor of diverse viewpoints in the classroom. 
142. Here we h.we echoes of Palmer P. Board of' Education: "Plaintiff would h.n-c us 
1;1shion f(>r her an exception to that general curriculum rule." 603 1:'.2d 1271, 1273 (7th Cir. 
1979). The Seventh Circuit recognized that "ftjhc issue is narrow." !d. So, too, is the 
reasonable accommodation exception proposed in thzs Comment. 
143. Vanessa A. vVernicke, Note, 'Ii·achrrs' Speech Ri;_qhts in the C!tz.uromn. A" Awzlvsi.1 of" 
Cockrcl v. Shdby Co~mry School District, 71 U. C:I~.I.. REV. 1471, 1471 (2003). 
144. Lima, mpra note 55, at 198. 
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3. Protection r~f the students) interests 
Reasonable accommodation of teacher negative speech rights 
protects and furthers the students' core interest in the determination 
of \vhether teacher speech is protected; that is, an interest in the best 
learning outcomes possible. As mentioned above, reasonable 
accommodation will not dep:ive any student of the opportunity to 
learn the prescribed curriculum. In fact, protection of negative 
speech rights through reasonable accommodation enhances the 
prescribed curriculum and benefits students through non-
threatening exposure to different viewpoints, protection from 
indoctrination and the "pall of orthodoxy," 145 and instruction in and 
affirmation of their rights as citizens participating in democracy. 
Reasonable accommodation validates the students' right to hear. 
According to Karen C. Daly: 
The right to hear contains two related components: the right of 
students to avoid indoctrination and the right to be exposed to a 
variety of ideas and viewpoints during the course of their 
education. Protection of teacher speech prevents the first right 
from being violated and enables the second right to be realized. 141' 
By refusing to teach material contradicting her own deeply held 
personal or religious beliefs, a teacher offers both a different view of 
the world and a brief, but undisruptive, respite from the orthodoxy 
of the classroom. It serves as a reminder that the prescribed 
curriculum provides one view of things, but by no means the only 
VIeW. 
More significantly, a teacher's exercise of her negative speech 
rights in the classroom offers students a practical demonstration of 
their rights as citizens and participants in democracy. Reasonable 
accommodation of these rights embodies the spirit of Justice 
Jackson's astute observation in Barnette: "That [school officials] are 
educating the young f(x citizenship is reason for scrupulous 
protectif)n of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not 
14S. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 3XS U.S. 5X9, 603 ( 1967). 
146. Dalv, supra note 24, at 31. Daly admits that the doctrine "rests on a relatively 
uncertain judici,1l t(nmdation." Id. (citing Catherine J. Ross, An EmczqiTtq Ri_qht fin· Muture 
Mi11ors to RrceiPc htfilrmatirm, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 223, 230 ( 1999) ("fT]hc right to receive 
int(mnation remai11s a relatively unexplored aspect of freedom of speech even when adults 
,1sscrt such a claim.")). But f(Jr policy purposes, the notion of a student's right to hear has at 
Jca,..,t son1c pcrsu~1sivc power. 
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to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount 
important principles of our government as mere platitudes. " 147 
Indeed, "[ s ]tudents cannot learn the value of their protected 
freedoms in an environment that chills the rights of the teacher to 
model and demonstrate." 148 And teachers "cannot effectively teach 
students to be powerful democratic participants when [they] 
participate like sheep. " 149 There is nothing sheepish about a teacher's 
exercise of negative speech rights through reasonable 
accommodation. In fact, the teacher might bring comfort and 
encouragement to students in the class or school who hold sincere 
personal or religious beliefs that require them to exercise negative 
speech rights by opting out of certain material in the prescribed 
curriculum. School can be an unforgiving place for students who 
must sometimes participate outside of the mainstream culture. That 
a teacher does too, on occasion, might be a welcome revelation. 
4. Protection of the parents) interests 
Parents hold interests in the prescribed curriculum being taught 
by the teacher, and in the education of their children as students. 
These interconnected parental interests remain undisturbed by 
reasonable accommodation of teacher negative speech rights. 
As the Seventh Circuit noted in Palmer, "[p ]arents have a vital 
interest in what their children are taught." 150 They establish and 
shape the curriculum through their representatives in government. 151 
As such, these interests mandate that "[i]t cannot be left to 
individual teachers to teach what they please. " 152 Thus, when a 
teacher ignores the curriculum in favor of his own atlirmative 
expression, this speech is not protected. 153 But with reasonable 
accommodation of teacher negative speech rights, there is no such 
deviation from the curriculum. All that changes is the person 
147. W.Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,637 (1943). 
148. Anne Gardner, Note, Preparing Studentsjiw Democratic Participation: Why Teacher 
Curricular Speech Should Sometimes Be Protected by the First Amendment, 73 Mo. L. REV. 213, 
236 (2008). 
149. !d. at 235 (citing RANDY BOMER & KATHERINE BOMER, FC)R A BETTER WORLD: 
READ!Nl; AND WRITING HlRSOCIAL ACTIO!'\ 19 (2001 )). 
150. l'almerv. Bd. ofEduc., 603 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1979). 
151. !d. 
152. !d. 
153. Sec supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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teaching it. Negative speech of the sort contemplated by the 
reasonable accommodation standard generally does not atlect 
parental interests the way affirmative speech can. 
C. Unconstitutional Conditions 
finally, a brief note on "unconstitutional conditions," a doctrine 
under which reasonable accommodation of teacher negative speech 
rights may be legally required. Put simply, the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine means that "even if a state has absolute 
discretion to grant or deny a privilege or bendit, it cannot grant the 
privilege subject to conditions that improperly 'coerce,' 'pressure,' or 
'induce' the waiver of constitutional rights." 154 When government 
acts as an employer, conferring privileges and benefits through hiring 
employees, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions might be 
applied. 155 This suggests that by not recognizing teacher negative 
speech rights, and thus conditioning employment on a waiver of the 
teacher's first Amendment right to free expression, the government 
runs afoul of the doctrine and must accommodate. 
The case for unconstitutional conditions is not so simple, 
however, f(x two main reasons. First, the doctrine "has little 
independent f()rce in modern practice. " 156 In fact, "when some 
condition is actually invalidated, the work is almost invariably done 
not by the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, but by something 
else entircly." 157 It is difficult to say whether this jurisprudential fact, 
by itself~ would invalidate a teacher's claim under the doctrine. From 
the cases reviewed in this paper, only rarely has "something else" 
been available tor application to the restrictions at issue. Nor have 
any of the litigants or judges seriously pursued an unconstitutional 
conditions analysis. 
Second, and more importantly, for the doctrine to apply the 
goYernment must require the teacher to waive a preexisting 
constitutional right. 15~ Thus, "care must be taken to ascertain which 
154. Richard Epstein, Fornpord: [!Jtcomtitutirmal Cmtditiom, State Power, tmd the Umiti 
ofCowmt, 102 H,\R\'. L. RFV. 4, 6-7 (19HHJ. 
ISS. Ko~cl, Iupra note 54, at 1029. 
I 56. !d. at I 030. 
157. Jd. (quoting hcdcrick Schauer, l'rinciplcs, Imtitutiom, mtd the First Ammdmcilt, 
112 H:\R\' 1.. Rl:\' H4, 103 (199RJ). 
ISS. Sec William G. Buss, Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech: Cmmmmicati11;11 the 
Curriculum, 2 j. (;FNDER RACE & jllSJ. 213, 235-36 ( 1999 ). 
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constitutional rights the complainant has and what it is that the 
complainant is being asked to give up as a condition of obtaining an 
opportunity offered by the government." 1" 9 Professor Buss has 
otlered the following illustrative discussion based on a situation 
where the government "tell[ s] a teacher who is hired to teach 
literature that she must assign Uncle Tom's Cabin and not 
Huckleberry Finn": 160 
The suggested parallel is that the teacher has been hired on the 
condition that she waive her constitutional right of freedom of 
speech to say what she believes to her students. . . . Citizens 
generally do have a constitutional right of freedom of speech to 
communicate ideas about Huckleberry Finn to a willing audience in 
a place where they have a right to be. Prior to being hired to teach, 
however, no one has a constitutional right to teach a particular 
subject in a particular place (say, tor instance, by assigning and 
discussing Huckleberry Finn to a particular group of students in a 
particular public school classroom). A teacher hired with directions 
to teach Uncle Trmz)s Cabin (and not Huckleberry Finn) has waiJJed 
no constitutional right, because the teacher remains free to exercise 
the right to communicate ideas about Huckleberry Finn to a willing 
listener not supplied by the employer at the place of employment. 
'What the teacher has given up is not a constitutional right because 
the teacher had no prior right to teach Huckleberry Finn to the 
group of students provided by the employer. 161 
Professor Buss's hairsplitting example clearly shows how, in 
general, restrictions on affirmative speech by teachers that strays from 
the prescribed curriculum do not amount to unconstitutional 
conditions. But in a case involving negative speech rights, the 
analysis seems less clear and more awkward-partly because the 
audience and location factors do not seem as relevant. Prior to being 
hired to teach, a teacher arguably has a preexisting constitutional 
right not to teach a particular subject in a particular place; put 
differently, bct(xe hiring the teacher, the government cannot f()rce 
her to teach a particular subject in a particular place. In that sense, 
then, by forcing the teacher to teach a particular subject in a 
particular place as a condition to its offer of employment, the 
159. /d.Jt235. 
160. !d. 
161. !d . • 1t 235-36 ( cmplusis added). 
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government has in tact violated the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine. Nevertheless, it seems likely that a court would simply 
characterize the preexisting constitutional rights and conditions in a 
way that avoids this outcome through hairsplitting similar to 
Professor Buss's audience and place considerations in the above 
example. In other words, the court would conclude that prior to 
being hired, the teacher had no constitutional right to engage in 
negative speech in front of a classroom full of children provided by 
the employer. Thus, while promising in theory, the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine would no doubt disappoint in practice. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Reasonable accommodation of negative speech rights fc>r 
teachers in the classroom would afford limited but vital protection to 
the First Amendment rights of teachers by requiring school officials 
to engage in good t~1ith cooperative efforts. School otlicials would 
still retain their substantial interests in promoting efficient operation 
and preventing disruption of schools, through both the expectation 
that the accommodation be reasonable and the limitations placed on 
teachers seeking to invoke the protection. Overall, the reasonable 
accommodation standard balances rather than frustrates the 
significant interests of the government, teachers, students, and 
parents. At the same time, exercise of such negative speech rights 
enhances the educational experience of students, expanding on the 
prescribed curriculum without ignoring or replacing it. In contrast to 
the currently prevailing frameworks, which largely favor the 
government by almost completely ignoring the teacher's rights, 
reasonable accommodation presents a more reconciliatory approach 
that serves all interests well. 
As Justice Souter observed in his Garcetti dissent: "[ T Jhe lesson 
of Pickering (and the object of most constitutional adjudication) is 
still to the point: when constitutionally significant interests clash, 
resist the demand fl:x winner-take-all; try to make adjustments that 
serve all of the values at stake. " 162 Reasonable accommodation 
162. Garcctti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,434 (2006) (Souter,)., dissenting). 
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represents just such an attempt at a small adjustment in a teacher's 
right to remain silent. 
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